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Introduction 
 
International aid plays major roles in modern politics. Many in donor nations 
view them as wasteful expenditures that hurt the donor nation, and others view 
them as corrupt industries that do not actually aid the receiving nation (Hassan, 
The State Capture Onset in Ethiopia: Humanitarian Aid and Corruption, 2013). 
Substantial research has been focused on these two questions, but what about 
instances of non-corruption? What are the effects of aid that reaches the intended 
recipients at the desired magnitude? The Samaritan’s Dilemma, put forth by 
James M. Buchanan, illustrates a relationship between a “donor” and a “parasite” 
(Buchanan, 1975). In a Samaritan’s game, the donor chooses between being 
charitable or not, and the parasite chooses whether to work or not. Throughout the 
game, if the donor chooses to be charitable, the parasite finds it much more 
advantageous to not work. This is often the statement used by those opposing 
welfare, but what if we apply this to a nation or society at large? The effects of 
not working at a societal level can be easily translated into a lack of industry or a 
decline in industry, either by direct loss or through attrition.  
 The loss of industry emanates from a crowding out issue. Consider an 
example in which a charity is willing to come to an area to build houses. Likely, 
there is someone with the skills and ability to build houses locally; their level of 
quality may be lower than the charity’s, but these local builders are capable. The 
charities add an issue for local businesses: the charities will do the work for free, 
or at a significantly reduced cost. Assuming the local builders were building 
houses at a given rate, who are the local consumers likely to choose if the 
charities arrive and are willing to build houses free or at a reduced rate? 
Consumers are more than likely to choose the free or reduced option. Thus, the 
local builders lose out on sales. If this trend continues, the local builders may be 
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crowded out by the charities. Similarly, a business may not start up if it believes a 
charity may simply show up and undercut it. Remember, this is assuming good 
intentions and without corruption.  
 To make a blanket statement about charities is erroneous and does not 
account for the distinct types of charities and aid. Infrastructure or education 
based charities, such as those put forth by Wydick, et Al., show an increase in 
schooling levels and salary levels in future years (Wydick, Glewwe, & Rutledge, 
2013). Improved and increased education is one of the most important aspects in 
improving an economy in the long-run. Their research suggests that child 
sponsorship charities achieve this. Thus, not all charities limit the economic 
output or potential output of an area. Similarly, infrastructure charities, e.g. those 
that dig wells, likely do little harm in the way of stunting economic growth. While 
there is little evidence to directly suggest this, one can surmise that, by increasing 
levels of infrastructure, we can expect a decrease in transaction costs and thus an 
increase in utility. All of these considerations are important when discussing the 
effects of charities and aid. We must ensure our focus is on the charities that can 
potentially cause harm. Thus, the charities discussed herein will be primarily 
donation-based and certain serviced-based charities (i.e. charities that simply send 
clothing or other miscellaneous goods, or those that travel to location and perform 
a service that a local populace could do on its own).  
 We examine empirically the effects of how international aid impacts the 
economic development of developing nations. Contrary to our initial 
presumptions, we show how aid simultaneously helps and hurts local economies. 
Local industries cannot compete with the lower or free cost services and goods 
that charities provide and are thus crowded out. This lack of local industry results 
in a lack of jobs and employment in these areas, subsequently resulting in little 
salary or monetary growth. These areas, lacking an industrial base of their own, 
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cannot afford to purchase goods since they have nothing beyond an export-
oriented economy, and, therefore suffer from scarcity for the goods they 
themselves cannot produce. However, aid does appear to spur on the development 
of infrastructure and allows for forward linkages and growth potential. Thus, aid 
is a complicated tool that results in short-term losses in exchange for long-term 
potential, and, since aid is not permanent, the negative effects will eventually 
dissipate.  
 
Literature Review 
 
The theoretical framework for this issue is laid out perfectly by Calmette & 
Kilkenny (Calmette & Kilkenny, 2002). They illustrate how aid, in times of 
calamity or disaster, skew the incentives of the local populace. They outline that, 
even in times of disaster and despite developing nations needing assistance, the 
long-term effects of foreign aid involvement can often do substantial harm to the 
local economy. Their research further examines the effects of situations caused by 
moral hazard, incomplete information, and adverse selection. They highlight 
issues of who and how much charities should help. Oftentimes, charity 
involvement is necessary, but many issues, such as moral hazard or adverse 
selection, make it difficult to assign aid to the correct country. They conclude that 
these excess costs are borne heavily by the neediest of nations. They highlight 
issues of exploitation resulting from charity involvement but also help lay some of 
the framework for optimal charity involvement.  
 An example involves the Australian aid program, specially aid to Papua 
New Guinea, Heinecke et al. is primarily an indictment of a failing aid program, 
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but throughout, the article outlines the reasons for a failing program (Heinecke, 
Dollery, & Fleming, 2008). Namely, they expound upon which circumstances aid 
fails. Fragile states especially are subject to aid harming their growth and 
development. They primarily focus on political institutions, governance 
mechanisms, and issues of corruption, but they nonetheless highlight the issues 
with sending large amounts of aid to fragile states. By focusing on macro-level 
issues, they highlight the difference between aid being sent to fragile versus more 
stable states. This difference underscores our claim that developing nations are 
potentially negatively impacted by aid. 
 One alternative perspective is the notion put forth by Nowak-Lehmann D. 
et al. (D., 2009). Their analysis pertained to both the short- and long-term effects 
of aid with Germany as the donor nation and around seventy-seven recipient 
nations, all primarily developing nations. They sought to answer the question of 
whether aid is effective or not for the donor nation. They contradict old findings 
that the benefits were large, about $4/$1 ratio of dollars earned/dollars donated. 
Their empirical study resulted in a positive ratio but a much smaller magnitude, 
around $1.5/$1 on the high end. Their premise is rooted in the concept that 
increased aid to developing nations increases the chances that the donor nation is 
the primary exporter of goods. This finding subsequently implies that by receiving 
a return on donation investments, donations must be beneficial. 
 Since we have already discussed aid in terms of an investment (Agosin & 
Machado, 2005), we now discuss foreign direct investment (FDI) in terms of its 
effect on crowding out: “If FDI enters the sectors where there are competing 
domestic firms, it may take away investment opportunities that were open to 
domestic entrepreneurs prior to the foreign investments” (Agosin & Machado, 
2005, p. 151). Their research highlights the crowding out of domestic investment 
due to the large volume of FDI. They lay out the theoretical framework for 
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improving FDI in order to help promote domestic investment. Similarly, 
donations, aid, and charity work can result in the same issues. The purpose of FDI 
is the return for the investor; for this reason, the benefits and returns of FDI may 
be more to the investor than the benefits the recipient receives. Similarly, as stated 
earlier, many donation groups view aid as avenues for returns at a macro-level. 
For example, donating large sums may garner favor in the recipient nation, or, if 
the aid is used for infrastructure, the donors may be able to capitalize upon the 
increased infrastructure. Thus, it is not a far stretch to see that the issues arising 
from FDI can also be created with charities in varying magnitudes. The authors 
outline how, even in a best-case scenario, FDI has left the recipient nation 
unchanged, whereas it is more likely it has done the developing nation harm by 
stunting domestic growth. These same results were replicated and noted in 
(Fahinde, Abodohoui, Mohiunddin, & Su, 2015). These authors note that various 
types of investment, FDI and development assistance all negatively contribute to 
growth in various countries in west Africa. Their “results show that ODA 
[developmental aid] have a lasting crowding-out domestic investment” (Fahinde, 
Abodohoui, Mohiunddin, & Su, 2015, p. 245). These authors then go on to show 
how these countries could develop better absorption rates and should improve 
technological gains, but this diverts from the scope of this discussion. Their initial 
findings still speak to the issue brought forth by many of the authors above. While 
crowding out is not a perfect comparison for charities, donations, and aid, we can 
note the similarities in the incentives they create and the outcomes they 
perpetuate. Thus, it is noteworthy to discuss them in similar context.  
 Beyond simply charities and aid that help during normal times, we should 
also consider aid in times of natural disaster. Cohen and Werker point out that 
“the addition of humanitarian aid to the model produces a bailout effect: 
governments underinvest in disaster prevention when they know that they will be 
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bailed out in the event of disaster” (Cohen & Werker, 2008). The issues of 
governmental dependencies continue to propagate in the face of humanitarian aid. 
These issues are once again on a macro-level and focus more on governmental 
actions, but it does imply a long-standing issue about the dependency on foreign 
aid. In fact, this relates very closely with the issue we are intending to study. A 
recipient country may under-invest in disaster prevention or repair if they believe 
that an international organization will step in to assist them in times of need. 
Thus, the firms that could have been created in these recipient nations are not 
created or are defunded. By not funding their own agencies and firms, these 
recipient nations are seeing a decrease in employment and job possibilities. One 
could argue that this should allow the workers who would normally be working in 
disaster relief jobs to find work in a new industry. The issue here is twofold. First, 
if this issue of crowding-out local industry pervades the entirety of the market, 
there may not be any jobs to fill. Secondly, since many of these nations are 
developing nations, there are intrinsically not many jobs to be filled. These 
authors conclude that, while aid during disaster times can help smooth shocks and 
prevent collapse of certain markets and areas, it also distorts incentives and may 
lead to a larger disaster fallout. 
 While not the focus of this study, a conversation about charity actions in 
developing countries could not be complete without discussing the impact of 
corruption. The study by Hassan (2013) about the effects of charity and aid in 
Ethiopia outlines how aid has been captured by ruling parties and rarely reaches 
those in need. The scope of Hassan’s work goes beyond the intentions of our 
study, but it is nonetheless important to lay out further issues regarding aid that is 
not carefully considered. Throughout his work, the author points to the misuse of 
aid funding by the ruling elite in order to repress and subjugate the lower classes. 
This is a very common and well-reviewed area: charity corruption. This is not the 
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focus of our work, and this is included to differentiate between what we are 
attempting to study. 
 Little research has been done regarding the effects of charities on 
economic development and crowding out. The issues revolving around FDI are 
similar to the ones we have found regarding charities. Both FDI and charities 
result in a crowding out effect that drives away and suppresses domestic 
investment and growth. Thus, in order to promote domestic growth, steps need to 
be taken by the international community and charities to curb unnecessary and 
frivolous aid. Ultimately, the crowding out results in local areas being 
uncompetitive with respect to the global market. The lack of jobs and 
opportunities results in a cycle of poverty and aid that hinder any group’s rise 
above it. While some articles show that aid during times of natural disasters is 
beneficial in that it helps to smooth shocks to the markets, it nonetheless skews 
incentives domestically. This skewing results in fewer domestic firms being hired 
by the governments to prepare or repair after a disaster hits. The model laid out by 
Calmette & Kilkenny illustrates optimum aid levels in order to prevent skewed 
incentives in times of disaster. Our work analyzes empirically the effects of 
charities in various developing nations in order to illustrate the effects of not only 
Buchanan’s Samaritan’ Dilemma but also the effects of those with respect to the 
aforementioned framework. We focus largely on the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia 
and utilize this as a case study. By utilizing the tsunami as a natural experiment, 
we can observe both time-series and cross-sectional data.  
Underlying Theory and Questions 
 
There are several effects we seek to examine. The first is moral hazard. 
Oftentimes, if persons are aware of safety precautions or some form of insurance, 
they take more risks than they otherwise would. The second is crowding out, 
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which is often referred to with respect to interest rates and government spending. 
The underlying principle behind this effect, however, is that the actions of larger 
institutions, such as governments or charities, often replace the actions of private 
firms and individuals. In our paper, we are examining two primary instances of 
crowding out: first, the effects of foreign aid and how it distorts the incentives of 
developing nations to prepare for disasters, which is also viewed as a moral 
hazard; second, the hindrance on local firms post-disaster due to the large influx 
of charitable actions; third, the effects of externalities regarding various regions 
and the aid they receive.  
We have determined four core questions that we seek to answer with our 
data: do developing nations, when faced with tools to preempt natural disaster, 
such as a tsunami warning, inadequately prepare due to the known existence of 
foreign aid and relief? Are local firms and businesses crowded out due to 
incoming relief aid? How does aid affect different regions of a nation with various 
proximities to the disaster? Are there externalities? 
 First, we examine whether nations prepare insufficiently for disasters. This 
could be viewed as a moral hazard issue; since these nations know relief aid will 
come in the event of a disaster, they may choose to inadequately prepare. This is a 
simplistic view, however. No doubt moral hazards such as these occur, but we are 
neglecting a substantial fact: cost and amount of funding. It costs hundreds of 
millions of dollars to create warning systems, and, often, many developing nations 
need this funding for a myriad of other purposes. They must choose between 
using this money to help prevent a high-cost but low-probability disaster or 
investing in growth of their industries. The low probability of these disasters 
skews the cost and, subsequently, the perceived need by these nations. Therefore, 
we can see how the existence of foreign aid potentially enables these nations to 
divert their scarce resources into other areas of the economy. Nations may wish to 
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invest in the profitable areas and forego the less-developed regions. For example, 
they may choose to improve a factory that has hundreds of jobs and is a major 
exporter over protecting areas with subsistence farming.  
The skewed cost of a disaster is evident in the aftermath of the 2004 
Indonesian tsunami when, in 2006, they began the process to construct an early 
warning system. According to Transportation Minister Hatta Radjasa, "part of the 
funds will originate from the state budget and the rest from foreign aid” and the 
total cost around $142 million, reported Roy Tupai (2006). Indonesia could not 
shoulder the burden alone and required this foreign assistance in order to prepare. 
This still puts a large burden on Indonesia.  This construction occurred after the 
tsunami, meaning a preemptive warning system before the 2004 tsunami would 
have been harder to encourage support. One of the major issues is quantifying the 
cost of a disaster. Due to the low probability and, more importantly, the fact that it 
could occur nearly anywhere, significantly hinders considerations of its cost. The 
public and, subsequently, the leaders, may be reluctant to spend such a large sum 
for something that may not ever happen. After the event, however, the nation has 
witnessed the cost and, thus, may be more inclined to prepare. Nevertheless, a 
moral hazard may exist, and we seek to examine whether or not aid distorts 
funding. Finally, one way our analysis on this topic would be more conclusive is 
comparing two disasters in the same nation. Having seen the destruction of the 
first disaster, a nation may better understand the costs and better prepare. 
Ultimately, this final note is left as speculation, but, if another disaster occurs, it 
could be utilized to answer many questions.   
 Second, are local businesses and firms crowded out by relief workers and 
aid? This question is not one answered purely in terms of aid.  We must examine 
the impact of boots-on-ground, or actual relief workers in country. This question 
can best be summed up in an anecdote. After the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia, many 
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NGOs and charities came to help with disaster relief. Oftentimes, these 
organizations lack manpower but have funding, thus they hire local persons and 
simply direct and pay for the relief effort. In the anecdote, these NGOs paid 
Western wages and attracted many individuals to them. This pulled local 
individuals away from local industries. The absence of labor hurt the local firms, 
and, when the NGOs left, the economy had been hurt despite the relief workers. 
The anecdote is not the proof, but the inspiration for the question. We want to 
examine whether this effect actually occurs. Do local firms, when faced by stiff 
competition from NGOs, lose out on labor and profits, ultimately deciding to 
close? By examining growth rates before and after disasters we can view the 
variations in trends of job growth.  
 Lastly, how do these and other effects impact various regions in a nation? 
Specifically, we want to examine areas affected by the disaster and compare them 
to nearby and more remote regions. Utilizing this data, we can control for various 
national policies that could potentially confound our results, but we can also 
measure effects of spillovers. By observing these differences, we can potentially 
observe cross-region crowding out, where businesses in regions unaffected by the 
disaster still lose business to NGOs and charities. This will also allow us to 
observe whether the effects of aid are localized or if they have national benefits or 
detriments. For example, does improving infrastructure is the disaster zone have a 
positive externality to nearby regions? These spillover effects can lead to more 
long-term growth in a nation despite the disaster.  
 Ultimately, we want to examine relief and foreign aid surrounding various 
natural disasters. We want to examine the potential moral hazard of over-relying 
on aid, inadequate disaster preparedness, crowding out of local firms by 
international organizations and charities, and whether there are any externalities, 
or spillover, for non-effected regions. By answering these questions, we can arrive 
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at a comprehensive view of aid and its effects. This data could then be useful in 
calculating appropriate aid measurements or styles; by improving the efficiency of 
aid, we can increase the welfare of a nation without exacerbating any latent 
issues.  
Methods and Analysis 
 
Our analysis focuses largely on Indonesia due to the large amount of data 
available. By utilizing the 2004 tsunami as an event study, we can examine the 
various regions affected and unaffected, both before and after the event, in order 
to obtain a more holistic view of the disaster and aid. While our initial desire was 
to include various nations and disasters, the limited availability of data has 
restricted our study to only Indonesia. Nevertheless, the dataset we have for 
Indonesia is very thorough. We have over 200 variables for the nearly 550 
districts in Indonesia. With this level of data, we thought it best to focus our 
efforts in order to understand it in more depth. The granularity of this data allows 
us to examine the local effects of the tsunami and aid on more than national-level 
data would allow. We have defined minor impact districts as those districts either 
adjacent to a major impact district or in line with the Tsunami, but at a greater 
distance. This description is somewhat loose with regard to damage, but it allows 
us to differentiate between nearby regions and regions on the other side of 
Indonesia. While the effects of disaster and aid may be catastrophic, it may only 
marginally affect a nation at large but be devastating to a local populace. 
Therefore, by utilizing this data over some other nations we examined, we 
believed we could get to the root of the issue and avoid any unnecessary noise.  
 We first began breaking down the data by category, such as poverty rate or 
unemployment figures, and by three different years. The tsunami occurred on 
  12 
 
26th of December 2004, thus, we selected the years of 2003, 2006, and 2011. By 
selecting years both before and several years after, we can gauge long-term trend 
changes in various economic variables; also, by selecting 2006, we can observe 
the effects of the vast amounts of aid that come in. The categories we selected are 
largely based upon the availability of data, as a substantial amount of data was not 
recorded in 2003 or 2006. Nevertheless, by utilizing infrastructure expenditure 
and various GDP expenditures, we can observe various conditions and situations. 
We also assigned dummy variables for the years and whether the area experienced 
a major impact, a minor impact, or no impact at all. All of the economic data was 
gathered through the World Bank and its various databases. Utilizing all of these 
variables, we have arrived at some interesting results to answer our 
aforementioned questions. 
 Lastly, there are some limitations in the data that we have. Due to lack of 
aid data at the regional level and the lack of aggregated charitable aid in both 
monetary and humanitarian forms, we must tread carefully in reaching our 
conclusions. The aid data that we have is for national levels only. We were unable 
to find these values for provincial or regional levels and had to simply resort to 
national level data. For this reason, examining a cross-section of a specific year is 
difficult and potentially deceiving. We attempted to compensate for the limitation 
by assigning the same aid level to each region. We chose this option since the 
changes in aid were the important aspects of the data. When examining one year 
alone, however, we have no change in this variable and, thus, the calculations 
return an error. Also, when examining time-series data, this variable is more 
accurate but creates an endogeneity issue, since areas with higher poverty are 
likely to receive higher levels of aid, for instance. We have attempted to mediate 
this problem by lagging the aid received by a year, due to the natural lag of 
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receiving money before actions and repairs actually occur. This does not remove 
the endogeneity issue entirely, but it does help to mitigate it.  
 In terms of non-monetary aid, finding data for this from a myriad of 
sources, such as charities and church groups, would be nearly impossible. For this 
reason, due to the nature of a natural disaster and the aid it will encourage, we 
assume that the aid data we have acts as a signaling tool for non-monetary aid. 
Vast swaths of aid were donated, and many organizations sent workers to help 
with the disaster. For this reason, we can safely assume that both monetary and 
non-monetary aid increased and decreased at roughly similar rates. Working from 
these assumptions and compensations, we begin analyzing our data and our 
questions.  
 Finally, for various economic figures, such as unemployment and labor 
information, most regions in Indonesia did not begin recording these figures until 
2007. For this reason, the first two years we have selected, 2003 and 2006, do not 
contain any of these figures. We have attempted to compensate for this 
shortcoming by utilizing the available figures and attempting to find a correlation 
between the labor figures in 2011 and other variables that are also available in 
2003 and 2006. By repeatedly utilizing these variables, we hope to use them as 
signals to compensate for the lack of labor figures in the 2003 and 2006 time sets; 
in other words, we are attempting to find an instrumental variable. For example, 
various GDP expenditures, which are available in 2003 and 2006, also strongly 
correlate with unemployment in the 2011 set. For this reason, we use these GDP 
expenditures as a rough tool to somewhat show changes in unemployment, even 
when the actual unemployment figures are not available.  
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Moral Hazard 
 
The first question we sought to answer was whether governments under-prepare 
for natural disaster due to known existence of foreign aid. We began examining 
this by focusing on 2003, since this was before the disaster, and observing the 
amount spent on infrastructure and the GDP expenditure on construction. We 
focus on these variables primarily due to their intrinsic nature toward lasting 
investments, such as buildings and infrastructure. Typically, in order to make a 
building or an infrastructure system disaster resistant, the cost is quite high. For 
this reason, we should expect both variables to be higher. Since these variables 
represent a nation’s or region’s expenditure on buildings and infrastructure, if 
they are markedly high, then we would assume that a substantial amount of funds 
is being supplied to not just construct areas, but construct them well. This could 
also account for areas of large growth, which is why we have utilized other 
expenditure types as control variables.  
 One limitation of the data is evident: since aid data is not at the regional 
level like the rest of the economic data, we are unable to utilize it as a variable in 
our regression. However, we have attempted to compensate for this issue by 
examining the infrastructure and construction expenditure in 2003 on the various 
districts. We are unable to ascertain whether aid has any direct impact, but the 
data does seem to imply a different answer altogether. Our regressions actually 
seem to imply that the region’s proximity to the disaster mattered very little in 
terms of infrastructure and construction expenditure.  Instead, we found that it is 
the economic strength of the region that influences the expenditure amount. In 
other words, the only thing that significantly affected the expenditure amounts 
was the wealth of region and how developed it was (see in Table 1).  
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This shows that nations choose to build up areas that have higher 
economic value and forego areas with less. This makes sense, as a developed 
region has positive externalities for the entire nation. It provides jobs and goods to 
export, attracts investors, increase tax revenue, and brings a myriad of other 
positive effects. An impoverished area, on the other hand, struggles to sustain 
itself, and brings little in terms of national improvement. Thus, when faced with 
limited resources and being able to only protect one region, nations will choose 
the developed one, as it provides a greater return for the nation. Similar to how 
one cares little about planning for retirement if one is struggling to make ends 
meet in the present, impoverished areas have little to protect that will yield a 
national return. Nations may be less inclined to prepare for disasters in areas that 
hold little value. They may instead focus their funding and preparation on areas 
that hold a strong economic value.  
 This conclusion is more of an educated inference, however, due to the 
obvious endogeneity issue of high-income areas and more infrastructure spending. 
The high-income areas are growing and expanding much quicker than others and 
have a substantial incentive for further expansion, whereas lower income areas 
will inherently receive less. This is in terms of raw infrastructure expenditure, 
completely irrelevant of disasters. For this reason, however, we can somewhat 
extend the logic to disaster situations. Nations do not expressly underprepare 
because of foreign aid; they merely prepare certain areas more than others based 
upon the value of that region. One final impact of this decision-making process is 
the mostly inherent randomness of natural disasters. While some areas are 
marginally more at risk than others, any coastal region is at risk overall of a 
similar disaster. Hence, since nations cannot feasibly prepare all regions, they 
must prioritize which regions are more important.  
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Foreign aid may play a role in their decision, though. Due to the existence 
of foreign aid, they may choose to not invest in poorer areas and instead use their 
finite resources to expand and protect areas of much more importance. Thus, aid 
may actually encourage nations to expand their growth in their best and 
burgeoning sectors and get more of a national return than if they had spent this 
preparing a poorer sector. Ultimately, aid allows nations to redirect their funds 
toward districts that will have higher economic return due to the comfort that aid 
will be provided to the poorer areas in the event of a disaster.  
Crowding Out 
 
The second question we sought to answer was whether aid, both workers and 
funding, crowds out local workers, business, and investment. We first began by 
examining the poverty rate. We spoke about the endogeneity issue early, but, 
nonetheless, the results are noteworthy. As one can observe on Table 2, noting the 
potential endogeneity issues, we see that overall aid tends to correlate with high 
poverty rates and, as expectantly, those areas hardest hit by the tsunami also 
exhibit higher levels of post-disaster poverty.  Even when controlling for regional 
variations of wealth, such as household expenditure and GDP expenditure rates, 
we still note an increase in poverty with response to aid. Not included below, due 
to not being statistically significant, our regressions show that, by 2011, the 
hardest hit areas exhibit a reduction in poverty, but again, this was not significant. 
We assume here that aid is going to the hardest hit districts. Since this is where 
the most damage occurred, it makes sense the charity groups and other types of 
aid would prioritize these regions over others. For this reason, we expect the 
effects of aid on majorly impacted districts to be much greater than any other 
region. One final note to keep in mind is that we have lagged our aid data. The aid 
data that is being tested is one year before the other economic figures. This helps 
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to somewhat mediate the endogeneity issue, since the aid influx occurred before 
the changes in poverty that we are testing. 
Second, as you can observe from Table 3, when we restrict the regression 
to non-majorly effected areas, we still note an increase in the poverty rate. This 
restriction allows us to rule out part of the endogeneity issue brought about by the 
aid data. We can assume that a vast majority of aid went to the majorly effected 
regions, and yet the aid that did go to other regions still has a negative impact. For 
every one percent increase in aid, we note a (.6) percent increase in poverty. 
Utilizing these statistics, we can observe how increases in aid actually appear to 
do some harm to jobs over time. We also note that various independent variables 
in the above regressions also correlate strongly with unemployment rates.  
 However, this view is not comprehensive. One consistent theme 
throughout every single regression and analysis we performed is that electricity 
rates always correlate very strongly and positively with growth indicators. Thus, 
when we observe Table 4, we can see that, over time, electricity rates in effected 
areas trends upward. Looking only at the time variable is misleading. Noting the 
2011 coefficients on both major and minor impact districts, we note that both of 
these points express an increase. This implies that, over time, since these are the 
areas that likely received the most in foreign aid, these districts have seen a 
marked increase in electricity rates. As stated, electricity rates correlate strongly 
with growth indicators. Therefore, we should see that growth should be occurring 
in these areas since, by 2011, both levels grow well beyond their initial points.  
 Therefore, combining the results of the above reports, we note that aid 
helps in certain ways but hurts in other. Aid does appear to crowd out workers and 
business, hindering investment, savings, and monetary growth. This ultimately 
leads to higher levels of poverty and an increasing poverty gap. At the same time, 
aid also helps rebuild vital infrastructure and bring electricity and clean water to 
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not only the areas that lost it but also to new areas. Contrary to our initial 
presumptions, aid does appear to hurt in the short run, but help in the long run. By 
helping to rebuild infrastructure and bring it to new areas, new forward linkages 
are investments that encourage future growth and development. They 
unfortunately do this by forgoing backward linkages. By utilizing foreign aid and 
workers, an influx of aid displaces a myriad of workers and hinders labor growth, 
thereby hurting the regions in the short term. Ultimately, to observe the long-term 
results, we would require more data, many years beyond that which we have. 
Nevertheless, it is hopeful to see that aid does indeed appear to help in the long-
run.  
 
Spillovers and Externalities 
 
Rarely does an event only affect those directly involved. Oftentimes, we have 
repercussions and consequences that effect those nearby. This concept is also 
applicable to disasters and the recovery. The damage done to the roads in one area 
may hinder travel through that region and ultimately hurt the economy of a region 
unaffected by the disaster, for example. Alternatively, creating new infrastructure 
may encourage new developments in nearby regions due to a greater accessibility.  
In order to observe this effect, we refer back to tables 2 and 3. Table 3 
restricts the regression to only minor impact and no impact regions, and the major 
impact regions are excluded. This allows us to observe the areas that likely did 
not receive the bulk of the aid. As we can see from above, aid still appears to 
correlate with poorer regions. While the endogeneity issue is still present, it is less 
noticeable here. In the previous crowding out discussion, due to the limitations of 
data and since we were discussing the hardest hit regions, confounding results are 
borne likely due to aid going to areas that were hardest hit and needed the relief 
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the most. In this instance, however, the areas in question were not badly damaged 
and suffered far less than the majorly effected regions. For this reason, the 
endogeneity issue somewhat diminishes. Since the hardest hit regions likely 
received the most aid, the minor impact districts likely received very little in 
relative terms. With this consideration noted, by observing Table 3, we still see 
the positive correlation between aid and poverty rates. 
This suggests that the aid spillover effects are also positive, but small. 
While we discussed earlier that aid hurts the majorly affected regions in the short 
term, it ultimately creates forward linkages and promoting future growth. A 
similar story can be told for the minor impact districts. When observing Table 3, 
we note an increase in poverty. However, when observing Table 5, we note a 
positive, yet insignificant, correlation between aid and electricity rates in minor 
impact and no impact districts. However, we note a substantially positive and 
significant growth in minor impact districts in 2011 relative to earlier years. 
Observing the coefficient on minor impact, we note that in 2003 and 2006, minor 
impact districts were much lower than unaffected districts. Yet, once the aid has 
been distributed and utilized, i.e. in 2011, we note a substantial growth of 
electricity rates in minor impact districts. The issue is whether this was purely a 
result of aid or if some other factors were at play. For this reason, it is safer to 
state that the spillover effects appear to emulate that of the crowding out question 
above. We note an increase in poverty rates with the influx of aid, but also appear 
to have an increase in electricity rates, leading to forward linkages and the 
potential for growth; however, due to the limitations of the data, we cannot 
attribute aid as the key factor here. 
In terms of the fidelity and consistency with our data, we performed a few 
various actions to test for any issues. First, we performed heteroskedasticity tests 
for each regression output, and the results were consistent with all of those below. 
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Since the Huber-White outputs were very similar to our findings, we have elected 
to not include them. Similarly, we used a correlation matrix with the major 
variables that were used, and it displayed some collinearity between a few 
variables. Thus, we re-ran the regressions with one removed, but the results were 
once again very similar. Throughout both tests the coefficients never changed, the 
R-squared values remained roughly the same, and the T-statistic also remained 
roughly the same. Thus, we feel confident in the consistency with our results.  
 
Results 
 
Contrary to our initial presumptions, aid does appear to promote long-growth and 
development. When examining our three issues, each time we arrive at a 
somewhat unexpected conclusion. As we stated earlier, we anticipated that aid 
would displace workers and local business by crowding out their potential. We 
approached this by using aid data as a signaling tool around the 2004 tsunami. As 
we have stated also, there are limitations in the data. First and foremost, we have 
neither the numbers for charity involvement, nor the figures for non-monetary aid. 
We have attempted to compensate for this by utilizing foreign developmental aid 
as a signaling tool. Secondly, the aid data that we have is only at the national 
level, whereas the rest of economic data is at the provincial level. This creates 
some issues when running regressions and drawing conclusions from them. Since 
we cannot know where the aid went, we must assume that a majority of aid went 
to the hardest hit areas. While this is a limitation, this assumption we make is not 
unreasonable. Despite some of these drawbacks, we have nonetheless arrived at 
some interesting conclusions.  
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 With regard to the moral hazard question, it appears that nations do not 
underprepare for disasters so much as they only prepare those areas that are 
important. By observing the amount of funding toward infrastructure and 
construction, the most important expenditures for minimizing the damage from 
disasters, we observe that the funding amounts had no relation to the magnitude of 
the impact of the disaster. Since each region has arguably the chance of being hit 
by a disaster, we observe that areas with higher levels of development are the 
ones being prepared for disasters. There are two important considerations to note 
here. One is an endogeneity issue brought about by the expenditures. Areas with 
higher levels of development almost always have higher infrastructure 
expenditure. Regardless of the level of risk a region is for disaster, we often 
observe wealthier areas getting more development.  
Secondly, an inherent part of infrastructure development is ensuring that it 
is resistant to disaster. Since making resilient infrastructure costs more than 
poorly constructed infrastructure, we can conceptualize resilient infrastructure is a 
normal good. Therefore, the wealthier areas may spend more on infrastructure 
because of the growing demand for it. By the same token, they are likely 
developing it to be resilient since they are wealthier. Hence, despite the former 
issue of endogeneity, we can still draw conclusions from what we have available. 
With all of these considerations, we have arrived at the conclusion that 
governments do not underprepare for disasters because of foreign aid; they 
instead focus their limited resources on the areas that have the highest economic 
return. They continually invest and secure the areas that benefit the nation. 
Furthermore, foreign aid likely does play a role in reinforcing this behavior, but it 
is a good thing. Since resources are scarce, a nation can spend its money on 
expanding and protecting a wealthy area that ultimately benefits the whole nation 
or spend its money protecting an area of the nation that brings little benefit and 
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directing funds away from the wealthier areas. Foreign aid allows nations to focus 
more heavily on the more developed regions, and, as these regions grow, they will 
benefit the nation as a whole.  
 With regard to the crowding out issue, it appears that aid may hurt in the 
short-run but does appear to help in the long-run. From our results above, we note 
that aid appears to correlate with higher levels of poverty, regardless of magnitude 
of impact. As we have stated, there is the issue of endogeneity, which is why we 
cannot state the part above with certainty. For example, if a business owner lost 
his house and business, he probably will care more about his house than the 
profits of his business. Due to this inherent limitation, we cannot draw any 
substantial conclusions from aid and the poverty amounts. If we had regional aid 
levels of data, we could observe the effects of aid on areas that were not hit by the 
tsunami and see if they had any crowding out; however, we do not have that data. 
Nevertheless, we were able to find some interesting results from the data. 
We note a significant and positive correlation with aid and electricity rates. 
Throughout a myriad of regressions, electricity rates have always correlated with 
higher levels of development. Thus, we observe that aid data and workers are 
making substantial repairs and developments in infrastructure. This is typically 
one of the goals of aid, so it is encouraging to see that it correlates. In terms of 
development and growth, this is imperative. Increases in infrastructure create 
forward linkages that not only assists those present but also encourages new 
business and persons to enter the area. Hence, aid appears to not only repair the 
infrastructure in an area but also brings more than was there before the disaster, 
subsequently preparing areas for substantial future growth. Combining both 
factors above, we note that aid creates forward linkages at the expense of 
backward linkages. Aid improves the infrastructure of areas, but does so without 
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spurring local workers and builders to be the ones to improve it. This is consistent 
with the work of James Buchanan (1975), the findings by Agosin & Machado 
(2005), and the results from Fahinde et al. (2015).  
 Lastly, with regards to the spillover effects, we note a similar trend as the 
crowding out issue above. Throughout our regressions, we note almost an 
identical trend as the one above. This is partially due to the limitations of the data, 
resulting in the same confounding variation as above. This aspect is one of the 
weakest in terms of correlation. Nevertheless, we do note a slightly positive 
correlation between aid and electricity rates in non-major impact districts. This 
could partially be explained due to how infrastructure is designed. For example, 
repairing and improving the electricity lines in only one district does little good 
unless one repairs all of the lines back to the power plant. Thus, we should see 
more comprehensive improvement. Ultimately, without regional aid data, this 
question is even harder to answer than the former.  
Conclusion 
 
Ultimately, we do note a positive impact between aid and development involving 
natural disasters in Indonesia. Despite the limitations in the data, we note that aid 
encourages nations to invest in their most profitable districts, and that aid may 
crowd out workers but helps to build up the infrastructure, invariably leading to 
long-term growth. More could be done on this topic, however. Our original 
intention was to include more nations in this study, but due to more aid 
limitations, we decided to abandon those and focus our efforts on Indonesia. The 
major limitation of any similar study will be data availability. The World Bank 
has been an amazing source of our data, but even it has limitations. One thing of 
note, for the good, is that a vast majority of regions in Indonesia did not record 
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data for years before 2007, but have since started to record this data. This will 
hopefully make any future endeavors much easier, and much more fruitful. 
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Tables 
Key of Variables 
Variable Description 
GDP_T__H__R GDP Expenditure of the Tourism, Hotel, and Restaurant industry 
GDP_CONS GDP Expenditure of the Construction industry 
MONTHLY_HEALTH_EXP_PER_C Monthly Per Capita Household Health Expenditure 
MONTHLY_EDUC_EXP_PER_CAP Monthly Per Capita Household Education Expenditure 
HOUSEHOLD_EXP_PER_CAP Household Expenditure per Capita 
INFRASTRUCTURE_EXPEND_ Infrastructure Expenditure  
ELECTRICITY_RATE Percentage of people with access to electricity 
SAFE_WATER_RATE Percentage of people with access to safe water 
MAJOR_IMPACT Dummy variable: Did the region suffer a major impact from the 
Tsunami 
MINOR_IMPACT Dummy variable: Did the region suffer a minor impact from the 
Tsunami 
IF_2003/IF_2006/IF_2011 Dummy variable: 1 if the data variable was in 2003/2006/2011 
respectively 
TIME 1 for 2003; 4 for 2006; 9 for 2011 
AID Net developmental aid to Indonesia 
POP Population 
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Table 1 
The effects of various figures on Infrastructure Expenditure in 2003 
Dependent Variable: LOG(INFRASTRUCTURE_EXPEND_) 
IF_2003=1   
    
    Variable Coefficient t-Statistic  Prob. 
    
    C 12.00948 4.354663  0.0000 
LOG(GDP_T__H__R) 0.394660 9.022918  0.0000 
LOG(MONTHLY_EDUC_EXP_PER_CAP) -0.206477 -1.336419  0.1823 
LOG(MONTHLY_HEALTH_EXP_PER_C) 0.054526 0.319138  0.7498 
LOG(HOUSEHOLD_EXP_PER_CAP) 0.702131 2.422940  0.0159 
MAJOR_IMPACT -0.099322 -0.257227  0.7972 
MINOR_IMPACT -0.058942 -0.203887  0.8386 
    
    R-squared 0.285273   
Adjusted R-squared 0.272078   
F-statistic 21.61981   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000   
    
    
 
Table 2 
The effects of various figures and aid on the Poverty Rate 
Dependent Variable: POVERTY_RATE (In percent, e.g. 15%=15.0)  
    
    Variable Coefficient  t-Statistic Prob. 
    
    C 106.0719  4.958019 0.0000 
LOG(POP) 0.826795  1.825610 0.0682 
LOG(GDP_CONS) 0.953764  3.787234 0.0002 
LOG(GDP_T__H__R) -1.743039  -4.928480 0.0000 
LOG(INFRASTRUCTURE_EXPEND_) 0.478238  2.028251 0.0428 
LOG(HOUSEHOLD_EXP_PER_CAP) -12.23986  -9.852943 0.0000 
LOG(MONTHLY_EDUC_EXP_PER_CAP) -0.824610  -1.278207 0.2014 
LOG(MONTHLY_HEALTH_EXP_PER_C) 1.372628  2.197759 0.0282 
ELECTRICITY_RATE -0.179566  -11.87731 0.0000 
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MAJOR_IMPACT 5.262932  3.751977 0.0002 
MINOR_IMPACT 1.179354  0.937715 0.3486 
TIME 1.062493  8.727932 0.0000 
LOG(AID) 2.795338  3.890777 0.0001 
    
    R-squared 0.500711   
Adjusted R-squared 0.494972   
F-statistic 87.24772   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000   
    
    
 
Table 3 
The effects of various figures and aid on the Poverty Rate in Minor and No Impact 
Regions 
Dependent Variable: POVERTY_RATE (In percent, e.g. 15%=15.0)  
IF MAJOR_IMPACT=0  
    
    Variable Coefficient  t-Statistic Prob. 
    
    C 102.2697  4.737089 0.0000 
LOG(POP) 1.026116  2.255959 0.0243 
LOG(GDP_CONS) 0.997938  3.950466 0.0001 
LOG(GDP_T__H__R) -1.814255  -5.106473 0.0000 
LOG(INFRASTRUCTURE_EXPEND_) 0.413605  1.739413 0.0822 
LOG(HOUSEHOLD_EXP_PER_CAP) -12.03335  -9.612316 0.0000 
LOG(MONTHLY_EDUC_EXP_PER_CAP) -0.964364  -1.484549 0.1379 
LOG(MONTHLY_HEALTH_EXP_PER_C) 1.537108  2.456612 0.0142 
ELECTRICITY_RATE -0.182533  -12.06829 0.0000 
SAFE_WATER_RATE 0.018251  1.305147 0.1921 
TIME 1.055180  8.603451 0.0000 
LOG(AID) 2.833101  3.905193 0.0001 
    
    R-squared 0.501602   
Adjusted R-squared 0.496650   
F-statistic 101.2835   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000   
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Table 4 
The effects of various figures and aid on the Electricity Rate 
Dependent Variable: ELECTRICITY_RATE (In percent, e.g. 15%=15.0)  
    
    Variable Coefficient  t-Statistic Prob. 
    
    C -101.7571  -2.918969 0.0036 
LOG(POP) -2.003820  -2.535582 0.0114 
LOG(GDP_T__H__R) 5.995800  9.372294 0.0000 
LOG(INFRASTRUCTURE_EXPEND_) -1.810867  -3.812306 0.0001 
LOG(MONTHLY_HEALTH_EXP_PER_C) 17.00558  18.04490 0.0000 
MAJOR_IMPACT 2.576335  0.647696 0.5173 
MINOR_IMPACT -14.89479  -4.633733 0.0000 
IF_2011*MAJOR_IMPACT 8.136850  1.386879 0.1658 
IF_2011*MINOR_IMPACT 12.06025  2.185020 0.0291 
TIME -2.662091  -12.73320 0.0000 
LOG(AID) 1.934176  1.295407 0.1954 
    
    R-squared 0.515075   
Adjusted R-squared 0.510813   
F-statistic 120.8753   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000   
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Table 5 
The effects of various figures and aid on the Electricity Rate in Minor and No 
Impact Regions 
Dependent Variable: ELECTRICITY_RATE (In percent, e.g. 15%=15.0)  
IF MAJOR_IMPACT=0  
    
    Variable Coefficient  t-Statistic Prob. 
    
    C -103.7955  -2.943003 0.0033 
LOG(POP) -1.952606  -2.444519 0.0147 
LOG(GDP_T__H__R) 6.094805  9.434019 0.0000 
LOG(INFRASTRUCTURE_EXPEND_) -1.877535  -3.911511 0.0001 
LOG(MONTHLY_HEALTH_EXP_PER_C) 17.03720  17.92389 0.0000 
MINOR_IMPACT -15.01326  -4.654181 0.0000 
IF_2011*MINOR_IMPACT 12.05335  2.176458 0.0297 
TIME -2.660933  -12.65620 0.0000 
LOG(AID) 2.002266  1.325518 0.1853 
    
    R-squared 0.519199   
Adjusted R-squared 0.515746   
F-statistic 150.3706   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000   
    
    
 
 
 
